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NOTES.
THE EFFECT OF THE NINETEENTH AMENDMENT ON THE
ELIGIBILITY OF WOMEN FOR JURY SERVICE.--It is no longer ques-

tionable that the legislature of each state may by statute prescribe
the qualifications which jurors in the courts of the state must possess,' so long as the substance and vital purposes of the right of
trial by jury are not impaired.- But the legislative viewpoint as to
what qualifications a juror should possess has greatly changed3 in
the history of the common law, and even of our own country, as
democratic theories came to be more widely accepted. And now in
'In re Shibuya Jugiro, i4o U. S. 291, 297 (189o).
' Strauder v. West Virginia, ioo U. S. 303 (1879).
'Proffatt on Jury Trial, Sec. 115.
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for jurors are the
most jurisdictions the qualifications prescribed
4
same as those prescribed for electors.
Where this situation exists, an important question is raised by
the extension of the suffrage to a group not previously entitled to
it; does such extension confer eligibility for jury service as an incident of the right to vote? The adoption of the Nineteenth Amendment to the Federal Constitution r has made this question arguable
in almost every jurisdiction; but judicial decisions of it may be
found before 1920, in jurisdictions where the suffrage had been
extended to women subsequently to the enactment of the statute
prescribing the qualifications for jurors. A review of these decisions reveals a variety of attitudes toward the question.
The question was first raised in 1884, and in four cases, the
Supreme Court of Washington Territory held that women were
eligible for jury service; but when the same question arose three
years later, the membership of the court having changed, these
decisions were overruled 7 in an opinion based on Blackstone's interpretation of the wording of the venire facias: "Under the word
homo, though a name common to both sexes, the female is excluded, propter defectum sexus." The court also said:' "When
legislators have prescribed the qualifications of jurors the requirement that they should be males has always been implied.
Whatever may be thought of the propriety of making females
voters, there is but one opinion among the great mass of the people,
male and female, concerning the imposition on the latter of jury
duty, and that opinion is firmly and unalterably against such imposition. The legislature . . . cannot be supposed to have
intended the accomplishment of that which the people so universally
disapprove. .
. ." It is submitted that it is difficult to understand how Blackstone's obviously illogical interpretation of the
common law venire facias can apply to the question under
consideration; and surely, when the court first determines from its
own knowledge the state of public opinion which a statute purports
to express, and then interpretes the statute according to its understanding of the state of public opinion, without the assistance of
any other guide, it has departed widely from the usually recognized
limitations of the judicial function.
L C. L. 225.
'Adopted August 26, i92o.
'Rosencrantz v. Territory,
416

2

Wash. Terr. 267 (1884); Schiling v. Ter-

ritory, ib., 283 (1884) ; Walker v. Territory, ib., 286 (1884); Hayes et al. v.
Territory, ib., 286 (884).

'Harland v. Territory, 3 Wash. Terr.

13i

(1887).

The court held the

law extending the suffrage to women to be contrary to the Organic Act of
the Territory and void, but stated in their opinion, that even had it been valid,
it would not have made women eligible to jury service.
'3 EI. Comm. 362.
'3 Wash. Terr. 137, 138.
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Five years after this decision, the eligibility of women to jury
service was discussed by the Supreme Court of Wyoming under
somewhat different circumstances. 10 The court indicated that they
considered constitutional a statute 1" providing that juries should
be selected from the male citizens, because it had always been the
settled law of Wyoming that only male electors were qualified
jurors, although females were entitled to vote and hold office ;12 and
they doubted whether jury service were either a right or a privilege,
though declining to express a settled opinion on that point. The
usual view is that jury service is a duty, 13 and so it would not
appear to be included in the constitutional provision for the equal
enjoyment of all civil
and political rights and privileges by male
14
and female citizens.
Twenty-five years later, a statute requiring that a jury shall
consist of "a body of men"' 5 was held by a Court of Appeal of
California to exclude females from jury service by implication,"
although another statute then in force provided that "Words used
in the masculine gender include the feminine and neuter."' 7 The
case of Chorlton v. Lings,' 8 which decided, under similar circumstances, that women were not entitled to an equal right of suffrage
with men in England, is cited, and strongly sustains the court's
view.
Two weeks after this decision, however, the legislature amended
the clause, "body of men"'r to read "body of persons," and
directed that jurors should be selected from among both male and
female citizens. " This act was held constitutional," and the legis" McKinney v. State, 3 Wyo. 719, 723, 3o Pac. 293, 16 L R. A. 710
(1892).
The Wyoming Constitution, Art. VI, Sec. i, granted to female

citizens the right to vote and hold office, and to equally enjoy with male
citizens all civil and political rights and privileges; and Art. I, Sec. 9, provided
that juries should consist of "men." The contention of the defendant, a
male who had been convicted of larceny by a jury composed exclusively of
males, was that the state constitution required that females, equally with
males, should be subject and eligible to jury duty. The court sustained the
conviction on the ground that this objection could be urged only by a
female.
Sess. Laws Wyo. 189o, c. 35.
Const. Wyo. Art. VI, Sec. i.
"Garrett v. Weinberg, 54 S. C. 127, 143, 144, 31 S. Z. 341, 344 (1898).
"Cons. Wyo. Art. VI, Sec. i. The solution of the problem in this
case should depend on the interpretation of "men" in Art. I, Sec. 9, of the
constitution of Wyoming, but the court seemed to overlook this point
" Cal. Code C. P., Ioo: amended May 29, 1917.
"People v. Lensen, 34 Cal. App. 336, 167 Pac. 4o6 (1917).
"7Cal. Penal Code, Sec. 7.

"L. R. 4 C. P. 374 (Eng. 1869). Harland v. Washington Territory,
supra, was also cited.
"Cal. Stats. I917, p. 1282 ff.
'In re Mana, 178 Cal. 213, 172 Pac. 986, L R. A. gi8 E, 777 (igIS).
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lative right to prescribe the qualifications of the jury was. fully
and properly recognized.
The majority of the Supreme Court of Nevada had little difficulty in deciding that women were eligible as jurors. 21 A statute
is a qualified
declaring that "every qualified elector . . .juror" 22 was in force when an amendment to the state constitution

granted the suffrage to women,2"3 and the court held that an indictment returned by a grand jury composed partly of women was
valid. The decision of the court was based on analogy to the right
of negroes to serve on juries, after the suffrage had been granted
them by the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments to the Federal
The court also drew attention to the general deConstitution.'
parture in America from the common law qualifications of jurors,
and correctly said :25 "Nor can we with any degree of logical force
exclude women (from jury service) upon the basis established by
Blackstone, propter defecturn sexus, because we have eliminated the
spirit of this term from our consideration of womankind in modern
political and legal life.

.

.

."

The court was aided in reaching

this conclusion by the existence of a statute allowing married
women to claim exemption from jury duty.2 6 The court's attitude
was thoroughly consistent with the trend of modern thought, and
its reasoning was entirely logical.2
The New York case of In re Grilli 2I does not aid in solving
the problem, for there the assertion that women were eligible to
jury service was made in the face of a statute providing that jurors
must be male citizens ;20 the contention was advanced that jury service is necessarily incidental to the right to vote, but the court
showed this to be incorrect by pointing out differences which had
existed from time to time between the qualifications for voters and
those for jurors.
But the Supreme Court of Michigan soon after declared that
30
the constitutional amendment giving women the right to vote,
Parus v. District Court, 42 Nev. 229, 174 Pac. 7o6, 4 A. L, R. r4o (i918).

Rev. Laws Nev., s.4929.
Const. Nev., Art. II, Sec. r, amended i88o.
Strauder v. West Virginia, supra.
Z42 Nev. 239.
"Nev. Stats. 19I5, p. 84; 1917, p. 32.
"An extremely modern attitude was displayed in Rose v. Sullivan, 56
Mont. 48o, i85 Pac. 562 (i919), the court holding that a constitutional
amendment eliminating the word "male" from the qualifications of voters
abolished every political distinction based upon the consideration of sex,
and made women eligible for an office required by statute to be filled by
"some male person."
llo Misc. Rep. 45, 379 N. Y. S. 795 (19i2o). Affirmed by the Appel24

late Division,
U.

OF

192

App. Div. 88S, 181 N. Y. S.938

PA. L Rv. 398

(192o).

(1920).

Cumming & Gilbert's Cons. Laws I\T. Y. 4359.
"Mich. Laws, 1919, p. 768.
24

Discussed in 68
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taken with a statute directing that jurors should be selected from
citizens having the qualifications of electors, 31 was sufficient to
make women eligible to jury duty. 2 They maintained that since
the purpose of the suffrage amendment was to make women
electors, its adoption places women in a class which makes them
eligible for jury duty; and the court indicate that certain clauses
in the state constitution which use the word "men" to denote
members of a jury3 3 should be construed together with the amendment, so that the word "jurors" is in effect substituted for the
word "men." The court was aided in reaching this conclusion by
the provisions of a statute that "every word importing the masculine
gender only may be applied to females as well as males." 3 But
since a provision for the interpretation of statutes, laid down in a
statute, cannot apply to a constitution, this argument of the court
is illogical, and so the decision seems to go even further than that
of the Nevada court.
The Nineteenth Amendment simply extends the suffrage to
women, who already possessed it in Massachusetts ;35 and there a
statute provided that "a person qualified to vote for representatives
to the General Court shall be liable to serve as a juror." 36 After
the adoption of the Nineteenth Amendment, the Supreme Court
informed the House of Representatives, in reply to an inquiry from
them, that women were not liable to jury duty,3 7 although they
admitted that the wording of the provisions was broad enough to
confer such liability. The court said that the General Court, by reenacting the description of those liabl to jury duty, in words previously used and without change, could not have intended to include
women. Their opinion was confirmed by the facts that the statute
makes no provision for exemptions of womdn, 8 nor for the convenience of women in court houses, and that the jury of "men" is
continued in another statute.30 This last circumstance alone seems
to justify the conclusion of the court; yet even the word "men"
is capable of broad interpretation, and the decisions of the Nevada
and Michigan courts, noted above, appear to interpret the legislative
intention more accurately, and more consistently with the general
trend of its expression.
'Comp.

Laws Mich., 1915, s. 1219o.

'People v. Barltz, i8O N. W. 423 (Mich. i92o).
of Pa. L Rev. 386 (1921).
'Article II, Sec. ig; Article V, Sec. 27.
" Comp. Laws Mich., 19,5, s. 64.
Mass. G. L., c. 51, s. I.
'Ib.,

Discussed in 69 U.

c. 234, s. I.

'In re Opinion of the Justices, 13o N. E. 685 (Mass. 1921).
"In Nevada, such provisions had been made: see note 29, supra.
"Mass. G. L., c. 123, s. 57.
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In Pennsylvania women had not the right to vote until the
adoption of the Nineteenth Amendment; and juries, by statute,
were required to be selected from "the whole qualified electors of
the county." 40 But in a recent case, the Supreme Court unanimously upheld an indictment found by a grand jury of which a
woman was a member."' The opinion of the court states that there
can be no question that the act providing for the selection of jurors
from the whole qualified electors covers those who at any time shall
come within the designation of electors. It is submitted that the
solution of the problem depends entirely on the construction of the
statute prescribing the qualifications for jurors.' The Pennsylvania
statute, in which the word "whole" is used, does not express a
legislative intention different from what may be expressed without
that word: [wherever a statute prescribes in substance that jurors
shall be selected from the electors, the legislative intention is clearly
to impose the duty of jury service on those who possess the right to
vote; if such an intention is predicated on any logical basis, it must
be on the legislative conviction that it is proper and desirable that
the same persons who can enjoy the right to vote should perform
the duty of jury service. On this reasoning, the conclusion of the
Pennsylvania court is logically inevitable, and it is to be hoped that
it will commend itself to other courts which are called upon to solve
the same problem.
A.R.C.
THE PRESUMPTION OF PAYMENT AS AFFECTED BY THE PRESUMPTION OF INNOCENCE.-Although it is somewhat doubtful just

when the presumption of payment, after a lapse of twenty years,
originated, it seems to have been well recognized in 1635.' "It is,"
said Sergeant, J., in more recent times, "a rule of convenience and
policy.

.

.

No person ought to be permitted to lie by whilst

.

transactions can be fairly investigated . .
until time has involved them in uncertainty and obscurity, and then ask for an
inquiry.

.

.

.

Hence statutes of limitation have been passed

I . and, in cases not within them, prescription or presumption
is called in as an indispensible auxiliary to justice." The presumption of payment applies to "all evidences of debt excepted out of
the statute (of limitations),' ' 2 and there can be no doubt that it is
applicable to judgments.3
Despite the fact that this presumption is favored by the law,
"Pa. Act of April io, 1867, P. L. 62,

s. 2; 2 Purdon 2062, s. 2; Pa.

Stats. 192o, s. 12861.

" Commonwealth v. Maxwell, 114 Atl. 825 (Pa. 1921).
v. Tucker, i Chan. Rep. 78 (Eng.).
Foulk v. Brown, 2 Watts. 209, 214 (Pa. 1834).
Cope v. Humphreys, 14 S. & R. 15 (Pa. 1825) ; Miller v. Smith, 16 Wend.
425 (N. Y. 1836); Chapman v. Loomis, 36 Conn. 459 (187o).

'Carpenter
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for the reasons given, it was held to fall before that of innocence,
in the recent Pennsylvania case of Gilmore v. Alexander,' in which
these presumptions came into apparent conflict. In that case, a
judgment was recovered by plaintiff, and execution attachment
issued, some twenty-three years before suit, the judgment being
assigned to use-plaintiff (a trust company) about a year after it
was recovered. To rebut the defense of the presumption of payment, the president of the trust company testified that no part of
the judgment had ever been paid. He had been with the company,
in various capacities, for some thirty years, and had formerly been
trust officer. His testimony was based partly on his personal knowledge, partly on the records of the company, and partly on the way
in which its trust business was conducted. He also testified that
there had been other trust officers to whom payment might have
been made, but that he would have heard of it, except in the case
of embezzlement. In the light of his testimony, embezzlement by
another trust officer was spoken of, in the majority opinion, as "the
only reasonable theory of payment," and, because of the presumption of innocence, an unacceptable one.
As to the ways in which the presumption of payment may be
rebutted, it has been said that "slighter circumstances are sufficient to repel the presumption than are required to take the case
out of the statute of limitations.

.

.

.

Still the circumstances,

whatever they may be, must account in some reasonable way for
the lapse of time, without demand or suit." " Thus the presumption of payment is rebutted by an acknowledgment of the existence
of the debt, by the debtor, at any time within the twenty years
necessary to raise the presumption,6 or even after that period has
run.7 Such acknowledgment, however, must be made to the creditor, and not to a mere stranger.' The.presumption is also rebutted
by the disability or incapacity of a party 9 (as where one becomes
an alien enemy, during a war),"° in which case twenty years must
be shown, exclusive of the disability period. 1 Insolvency of the
debtor is generally considered sufficient, 2 but in Pennsylvania,
actual continued inability to pay must also be shown,' 3 as in the
4268 Pa. 415, 112 Atl. 9 (1920).
'Foulk v. Brown, supra, 21S.

'Stout v. Levan, 3 Pa. 236 (1846); Reed v. Reed, 46 Pa. 239 (1863).
IEby v. Eby, 5 Pa. 435 (,846).
'Bentley's Appeal, 99 Pa. 50o (1882).
'McLellan v. Crofton, 6 Me. 307 (183o); Criss v. Criss, 28 W. Va.
388 (886).
" Bailey v. Jackson, 16 Johns 201 (N . Y. 18i9).
v. Ball, 2 Cranch 184, 2 L. Ed. 246 (U. S. Sup. Ct. 1804).
UDunlop
'Fladong v. Winter, 9 Ves. Jr. 197 (Eng. 1812); McKinder v. Littlejohn, 4 Iredell Law 198 (N. C. 1843).
"Devereux's Estate, 184 Pa. 429, 39 Atl. 225 (1898).
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case of poverty of the debtor.14 The presumption is, of course,
rebutted by payment of a part of the debt, or of interest on it, 15
as it is by an agreement to withhold demand for payment.10 However, where a conspiracy with other debtors, to resist the creditor,
In
was shown, the presumption of payment was held to stand.'
one of the most extreme cases, relationship between the debtor and
creditor was considered sufficient to overturn the presumption.'
There seems, however, to be but a single case suggesting that the
9
presumption of innocence will rebut the presumption of payment.
In that case, the court itself finally dismissed the presumption
of payment as inapplicable, for other reasons.
The presumption of innocence, however, is generally recognized in civil cases,2 ° except in New York, where it is rejected on
the ground that the civil plaintiff "rests only under the burden of
proving his case by a preponderance of evidence." 21 In a word,
the New York courts treat the presumption of innocence as exactly
what it is, a mere administrative expedient to insure that, in criminal cases, the state shall prove its case beyond a reasonable doubt.
This view, though clearly preferable in theory to the ordinary one,
has not been adopted elsewhere.
Logically speaking, the best statement of the presumption of
innocence (and that to which the overwhelming majority of cases
conform) is that "a person who is shown' to have done any act
is presumed to have done it innocently and honestly." 22 Adapting
this to the principal case, it follows that, where the doing of an
act in an honest way, involves doing another act, such as recording
the payment, a simple syllogism gives the proposition that "where
a trust officer is shown to have received payment, he is presumed
to have recorded it." From this it is proposed to deduce that
"where a trust officer has not recorded payment, he is presumed not
to have received it." Not content with this inference, which does
not logically follow from the proposition given, use-plaintiff seeks
to pile Pelion on Ossa, by drawing from this the final inference (or
presumption, since presumptions are but inferences by another
name) that no payment at all was made, and hence that the presumption of payment is rebutted.

"Taylor v. Megargee, 2 Pa. 225 (1845).
5 Shields v. Pringle, 2 Bibb. 387 (Ky. 1811); Runner's Appeal, 121 Pa.
649, I5 AtI. 647 (1888).
"Fisher v. Phillips, 4 Baxt. 243 (Tenn. 1874); Hale v. Pack, Io W. Va.
145 (1877).
" McQuesney v. Hiester, 33 Pa. 435 (i859).
Vanmaker v. Van Buskirk, i N. J. Eq. 685 (1832).
" Potter v. Titcomb, 7 Me. 302 (183I).
.Breiden v. Paff, 12 S. & R. 430 (Pa. 1825) ; Gossett v. Godfrey, 26 N. H.
415 (1853); Chapman v. Mclllwrath, 77 Mo. 38 (1882).
- Kurz v. Doerr, i8o N. Y. 88, 72 N. E. 926 (1904).
'Lawson on Presumptive Evidence, 112.
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Use-plaintiff's efideavor is directed along the right lines, since
the process of rebutting presumptions amounts to nothing more
than building up contrary inferences, of equal or greater strength,
23
Unfortunately, however, this train of
by means of evidence.
reasoning conflicts with the rule that "as proof of a fact, the law
permits inferences from other facts proved, but does not allow
presumptions of facts from presumptions. A fact being established, other facts may be, and often are ascertained by just inferences. Not so with a mere presumption of a fact-no presumption
can, with safety, be drawn from a presumption." 24 This rule is
25
It is interesting to note, in this connection,
generally recognized.
that the case cited by Thompson, J., as an illustration of the proper
application of the2 rule, is essentially the same as that presented by
the principal case.
The presumption of innocence is seen to be inapplicable to the
principal case, even when considered alone, and without drawing
inferences from it. The presumption can only be stated correctly
in its affirmative form, as above, since to put it in the negative, as
has been done in some few cases, is to disregard the rules of logic.
It is evident, from defendant's reliance on the presumption of payment, that no specific acts of payment have taken place. Yet, to
show that there has been no payment, by showing that there have
been no such acts, use-plaintiff relies on a presumption which presupposes their existence. The result of this attempted reductio ad
absurdum is an indistinguishable tangle of logic and illogic, demonstrating clearly the inapplicability of the presumption of innocence.
Even were the presumption applicable in the principal case,
the use proposed to be made of it would be clearly fallacious.
Payment might have been made to any one of the several trust
officers; each is, of course, entitled to his own personal presumption of innocence. Shall all these be merged into one grand pre27
sumption? "The law," says Simpson, J., in his dissenting opinion,
"does not permit . . . the presumption of innocence of each
one of a number of its (use-plaintiff's) employees to be added
together to make one general presumption of innocence, and therefrom deduce presumption of non-payment to it."
Professor Thayer has shown that, although presumptions are
generally regarded as belonging to the law of evidence, they in fact
come within the province of legal reasoning, and "for reasoning
there is no law other than the laws of thought." 28 Therefore a
Black, C. J., in Sellers v. Holman, 2o Pa. 321 (1853).
"Thompson, J., in Douglass v. Mitchell's Executor, 35 Pa. 440 (I86o).
Pennington v. Yell, ii Ark. 212 (85o) ; Manning v. Ins. Co., Ioo U. S.
693, 25 L Ed. 761 (1879) ; Glick v. Ry., 57 Mo. App. 97 (1894).
' Douglass v. Mitchell's Executor, supra, 443.
'Joined in by Kephart, J.
'Preliminary Treatise on Evidence, 314.
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logical analysis of the possibilities in the situation presented by the
principal case cannot fail to be illuminating. It is first seen that
defendant, by setting up the presumption of payment, has thrown
the burden of proving non-payment on his opponent. To prove
this, the testimony of the president of use-plaintiff company is
offered. His testimony,, however, when strictly examined, is seen
to amount, at most, to proof that payment was not made to -him,
nor to any other person within his knowledge. Since no man is
omniscient, it is entirely possible that payment was in fact made to
some one else. If so, to whom was it made? Perhaps one of the
former trust officers received it; but let it be assumed that the
presumption of innocence eliminates them. Might not the judgment
debt have been paid to some other one of use-plaintiff's numerous
employees? Giving all of them the benefit of the presumption of
innocence, might not the money have been stolen by an outsider,
after payment, but before recording the fact in the books? Are all
outsiders to be presumed innocent? Human experience shows that
they are not so in fact. Even were they so considered, it would
still be entirely possible that the money should have become lost by
the negligence of an employee of use-plaintiff. Is every person who
may have dealt with the money to be presumed free from negligence? Even so, the loss might have been purely accidental, for
payment in such cases was shown to have generally been by cheque,
and "the wind bloweth where it listeth." Is a special Providence
to be considered as having been detailed to guard the particular
cheque? All these are reasonable possibilities, and a theory which
entirely disregards them cannot fairly be said to be the "only
reasonable" one. To properly support the theory of non-payment,
it would be necessary to indulge every one of the presumptions
required to eliminate these possibilities.
"Although individual presumptions are based on policy, the
general theory of inference and presumption is merely an attempt
to arrive at a fact by showing its probability. The more presumptions, then, that it is necessary to indulge, in order to prove
a particular fact by eliminating all contrary possibilities, the less
probable the fact becomes. The probability of that fact might
well be compared to the end term of a mathematical series which
is rapidly approaching zero as a limit; the more terms (presumptions) there are, the nearer the end term approaches that limit.
So, in the principal case, with each presumption which is indulged,
the ultimate fact of non-payment diminishes in probability, and,
because of the number of them which have been shown to be
necessary, it seems fair to say that such ultimate fact approaches
perilously near the zero of probability and of probative value.
A.C.S.
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CONVICTION UNDER A STATE PROHIBITION ACT NOT A BAR TO
TRIAL UNDER THE VOLSTEAD AcT.-Prior to the Eighteenth Amend-

ment the regulation or prohibition of the sale of alcoholic liquors,
except as affected by the interstate commerce laws, was within
the power of the states. The second section of the amendment,
providing that, "The Congress and the several states shall have concurrent power to enforce this article by appropriate legislation,"
has been onstrued to give Congress power not exclusive but territorially co-extensive with the prohibition of the first section, separate from and independent of the legislation of the states.' In
those states which have not since passed prohibition statutes the
old statutes regulating the sale of liquor have been held to remain
in force except in so far as they are repugnant to the Volstead
Act.2 The result is that practically the entire country is subjec
to two laws, one federal, the other state, bearing upon the enforcement of the Eighteenth Amendment.
In United States v. Regan 3 a previous conviction in a state
court for violation of the state prohibition statute was held to be
no bar to a prosecution in the federal court, based in the same
transaction, for violation of the Volstead Act. The court stated:
"I do not decide this question against the defendant without some
misgivings, because double punishment is obnoxious to the ordinary
conception of right." The opposite view was taken in United
States v. Peterson,4 but the trend of the decisions throughout the
country ' is with United States v. Regan." The wording of the
Fifth Amendment of the Constitution of the United States is:
"Nor shall any person be subject for the same offense to be twice
put in jeopardy of life or limb." (Italics supplied.) The reasonagainst
ing in the cases is that one act gives rise to two offenses, one
7
each sovereignty. To quote the court in U. S. v. Bostow, "It will
be conceded that the offender cannot be tried in the federal court for
violation of the state statute, nor in the state court for the violation
of the federal statute; so it appears that the offense is not the act
or transaction alone, but that the act or. transaction must be considered in the light of the legislative provisions and prohibitions."
Although the wording of the amendment, giving "concurrent
power," is without precedent in the constitution or previous amendments, practically analogous situations have arisen under our dual
'National Prohibition Cases, 253 U. S. 350 (19,9).
2 Commonwealth v. Vigliotti, 75 Pa. Super. 366 (i92I).
s273 Fed. 727 (1921).
'268 Fed. 864 (i92I).

'See United States v. Holt, 27o Fed. 639 (1921) ; Martin v. United States,
271 Fed. 685 (i92i) ; United States v. Bostow, 273 Fed. 535 (1921) ; Bryson v.
State, io8 S. E. 63 (Ga. i9mI).
'Supra, note 3.
"Supra, note 5.
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system of government. The question was first discussed in 1820
in the case of Houston v. Moore," where the prosecution was for
refusal to serve in the state militia when called upon by the President. In that case Justice Washington said: "If the jurisdiction
of the two courts be concurrent, the sentence of either court, either
of conviction or acquittal, might be pleaded in bar of the prosecution before the other;" but Justice Johnson in a separate opinion
expressed his inability to see why, when there is a double allegiance,
there cannot be a double punishment. An early Massachusetts
case, 9 where the conviction was for uttering counterfeit coins, followed the opinion of Justice Washington quoted above. The question again came before the Supreme Court of the United States in
the case of Moore v Illinois,10 where the plaintiff had been convicted under a statute of Illinois for harboring a fugitive slave. The
court held that it was no objection to the constitutionality of a state
law that the offender might be liable to punishment under an Act
of Congress for the same act. Other offenses which have caused
discussion of this point are robbing the mails, 1' breach of duty as an3
election officer,' 2 and violation of the part of the Immigration Act 2
which prohibits keeping, for the purpose of prostitution, any alien
woman or girl, within three years after she shall have entered the
United States." From an examination of the authorities the law
is clear that technically conviction and punishment under a state
statute is no bar to conviction and punishment under a federal law
for the same act; but this conclusion is almost invariably accompanied by the observation that, except where the circumstances are
extraordinary, such double punishment should not be inflicted.' 5
A reflection of this feeling is found in the recent cases under the
Eighteenth Amendment, in several of which the court, after justifying the double punishment as a legal proposition, goes on to
remark that in practice the punishment already
inflicted upon the
16
.accused should be taken into consideration.
A similar doctrine has been developed in most states to govern
the situation17 when a municipality and the state have concurrent
jurisdiction.
' 18 U. S. i (82o).
'Commonwealth v. Fuller, 49 Mass. 313 (1844).
2 55 U. S. i3 (1852).
"United States v. Amy, 24 Fed. Cas. No. 14,445 (1859).
"-2Ex patre Siebold, ioo U. S. 371 (879).
" U. S. Comp. St. Supp. 1907, p. 392.
"United States v. Palan, 167 Fed. 991 (i9o9).
5 United States v. Palan, supra, note 14.
"United States v. Holt, supra, note 5; United States v. Bostow, supra,
note 5.
1? Ehrlick v. Commonwealth, 125 Ky. 74-12,
102 S. W. 289 (I9o7); In re,
Henry, 15 Idaho 755, 99 Pac. io54 (19o9); Ex parte Simmons, 4 Okl. Cr.
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Any possibility of conflict between the state and federal courts
is avoided by an application of the old rule of comity among courts
having concurrent jurisdiction: the court which first has control
of the subject matter shall continue to exercise jurisdiction until
judgment, without molestation or interference from the other.18
T. McC., 3d.
STATE COMPENSATION ACTS AND MARITIME AcCIDENTS.-One

of the most interesting chapters in the history of the Workmen's
Compensation Acts deals with the question whether accidents
which are of a maritime nature and therefore of admiralty cognizance come within the scope of these acts. The Constitution provides that the judicial power shall extend to all cases of admiralty
and maritime jurisdiction' and that Congress may make necessary
and proper laws for carrying out granted power.2 The Judiciary
Act of 1789 granted to the district courts "exclusive original cognizance of all civil causes of admiralty and maritime jurisdiction, saving to suitors, in all cases, the right of a common law remedy where
the common law is competent to give it.3 Under this statute the
district courts had exclusive jurisdiction of actions in rem,, while
the state courts exercised concurrent jurisdiction of actions in
personam.5 Whether the reservation of a common law remedy
was meant to include statutory changes was questionable, but
long before the Workmen's Compensation Acts came into existence
there was authority for including within the saving clause of the
statute state legislation which in a sense affected general maritime
law.7 Following this authority, as the cases arose under the compensation statutes, it was practically uniformly decided by the
courts that the compensation acts came within the saving clause
662, 112 Pac. 95I (I9II). Contra: Brooke v. State, 155; Ala. 78, 46 So. 49!
(i9o8); Bryan v. Commonwealth, 126 Va. 749, IOI S. E. 316 (igig).
s United States v. Wells, 28 Fed. Cas. No. 16,665 (1872).
'Article III, Sec. 2.
2 Article I, Sec. 8.
' Sec. 9. Carried into Rev. Stat. Sec. 563 and 711; and thence into Judicial
Code, cl.
3, Secs. 24 and 256.
Sherlock v. Ailing, 93 U. S.99 (1876); The Robt. W. Parsons, 9iI U.
S. 17 (19o3).
'Leon v. Galceran, ii Wall. 185 (U. S. 1870); Navigation Co. v. Merchants Bank, 6 How. 344 (1848); Manchester v. Massachusetts, 139 U. S.

240 (i891).

'American Co. v. Chase, 16 Wall. 522, 533 (U. S. 1872); Knapp v. McCaffrey, 177 U. S.638 (I9oo).
'In the Hamilton, 207 U. S. 398 (907), a state statute creating a liability for death by wrongful act was enforced in a court of admiralty. See
also: Cooley v. Board of Wardens, 12 How. 299 (I85I), where pilotage
fees were fixed; and The Lottawanna, 21 Wall. 558 (1874), where state
liens for repairs upon vessel in home port was recognized.
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of the statute, and that state courts might apply them to accidents
of a maritime nature.8
Then the case of Southern Pacific R. R. Co. v. Jensen came
before the United States Supreme Court.9 In that case a stevedore
was injured while unloading an interstate vessel at a wharf in New
York. Compensation was granted by the New York courts, but
this was reversed by the Supreme Court on the ground that the
New York Workmen's Compensation Law created a remedy unknown to the common law and incapable of enforcement by the
ordinary processes of any court, and hence that act is not among
the common law remedies which are saved to suitors from the
exclusive admiralty jurisdiction by the Judiciary Act of 1789. The
decision was followed by the state courts, none of the latter limiting its effect to maritime accidents of an interstate charactere The
Jensen case was decided inMay, 1917.
In October of that year Congress amended the Judiciary Act
of 1789 by adding to the saving clause the words "and to claimants
the rights and remedies under the Workmen's Compensation Laws
of any state." " This was an admitted attempt expressly to confer
jurisdiction on the several states to deal with maritime accidents by
'Stoll v. Pacific Coast S. S. Co., 2o5 Fed. 169 (1913) ; Jensen v. So.
Pacific R. R., 215 N. Y. 514 (I9Z5), reversed by U. S. Supreme Ct, 244 U.
S. 205 (917); In Re Walker, 215 N. Y. 529 (1915), reversed by U. S. Supreme Ct., 244 U. S. 255 (1917); Lindstrom v. Mutual S. S. Co., 132 Minn.
328, i56 N. W. 669 (iq96); Kennerson v. Thames Towboat Co., 89 Conn.
367, 94 Atl. 372 (1915); North. Pacific S. S. Co. v. Industrial Commission,
34 Cal. App. 39o, 163 Pac. 204 (1917); Riegel v. Higgins, z4 Fed. 718
(1917). Contra: Scheude v. Zenith S. S. Co., 216 Fed. 566 (1914), which
held that maritime law determines the rights of the parties even in a state
court State v. Daggett, 87 Wash. 253, 151 Pac. 648 (i915), which held that
the compensation law did not apply because of the limited liability statute
applying to owners of vessels.
244 U. S. 205 (917).
See notes on this case in 27 Yale L. J. 255, 924;
6 Cal. L R. 72; 31 Harv. L. R. 488; i7 Col. L. R. 703; i5 Mich. L. R.

657.

" Neff v. Industrial Com. of Wis. 166 Wis. 126, 164 N. W. 845 (1917);
Veasey v. Peters, 142 La. 1012, 77 So. 948 (1917). Reversed after passage
of the amendment to the JudiciaryAct.

Mass. 313,

121

See note 12. Duart v. Simons,

231

N. E. io(i918), holding that even consent of the parties will

not confer jurisdiction under the Jensen decision.

Doey v. Howland, 224 N.

Y. 30, i--o
N. E. 53 (i918); Anderson v. Johnson, 224 N. Y. 539, 12o N. E.
55 (i918); Keator v. Rock Plaster Mfg. Co., 224 N. Y. 540 (i9i8); Sullivan
v. Hudson Nay. Co., i69 N. Y. Supp. 645 (i918); Thornton v. Car Ferry Co.,
202

Mich. 609, 168 N. W. 410 (I918); Sterling v. London Guaranty Co., 233

Mass. 485, 124 N. E. 28 (I919); Soderstrom v. Curry & Whyte, 143 Minn.
154, 173 N. W. 649 (I919); Ga. Casualty Co. v. American Milling Co., i69
Wis. 456, 172 .. W. 456 (i919) ; White v. Cowper Co., 25o Fed. 350 (1919),
where plaintiff recovered in Admiralty after being refused compensation. In
So. Surety Co. v. Stubbs, i99 S.W. 343 (Tex. 1917) it was decided that the
Jensen decision did not operate to prevent an action on an insurance policy
issued under the Texas Employers' Liability Act.
"40 U. S. Stat. at Large, c. 97. Sec. 2, approved Oct. 6, 1917.
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compensation laws. Once again it was held that the compensation
statutes applied to maritime accidents, and that a person injured
by a tort cognizable in admiralty could proceed in admiralty, at
common12 law, or under the provisions of a state compensation
statute.
Again the Supreme Court rendered a decision which eliminated
compensation statutes from the remedies for maritime torts. In
the case of The Knickerbocker Ice Co. v Stewart, 3 the amendment
of 1917 was held unconstitutional, on the ground that the direct
control by Congress and the uniform rule throughout the country
contemplated by the grant to Congress of authority to legislate
concerning rights and liabilities within maritime jurisdiction and
remedies for their enforcement were defeated by the act of Congress delegating the power to the states, and that therefore the act
was void- Three recent decisions, following the authority of the
Knickerbocker Ice Co. case, are illustrative of the present state
of the law. A longshoreman,' 4 an employee of a stevedore, 5 and
the mate of a coastwise vessel 16 were denied compensation on the
ground that injuries of a maritime character are no longer within
the jurisdiction of the compensation statutes. Obviously the one
thing Congress could do was to extend the provisions of the Federal
Employers' Liability Act to cases of maritime character. Such an
act would meet the Knickerbocker Ice Co. decision, for the act
would be direct, and not delegated, and the rule would be uniform.
Has Congress done so? Among the miscellaneous provisions of
the Merchant Marine Act of I92o ' is found a provision that "any
seaman who shall suffer personal injury in the course of his employment may, at his election, maintain an action for damages at
law, with the trial by jury, and in such action all statutes of the
United States modifying or extending the common law right or
remedy in cases of personal injury to railway employees shall
apply." It is evident that the extent of this law depends upon the
meaning of the word "seaman." The most recent statute defining
the word declares that "every person (apprentices excepted) who
shall be employed or engaged to serve in any capacity on board a
vessel shall be deemed and taken to be a seaman."'
Employees
on a barge for transporting bricks, whose chief duty was loading
'Siebert

Smith Porter

v. Patapsco Stevedore Co., 253 Fed. 686 (1918); Rohde v.
Co., 259 Fed. 305 (i919) ; Hogan v. Buja, 262 Fed. 224 (i92o) ;

Cimmino v. Clark,

172

N. Y. Supp. 478.

Stewart v. Knickerbocker Ice Co.,

226 N. Y. 3o2, reversed in 253 U. S. 149.
3253 U. S. i49, decided May 17, i92o.

"Lawson v. S. S. Co., 86 So. 815 (La. i92i).
"Zampiere v. Spencer, i85 N. Y. Supp. 639 (1921).
16Dorman's
case, ie9 N. E. 352 (Mass. 1921).
"

Sec. 33, Merchant Marine Act of i92o, approved June 5,

'Rev.

8392.

192o.

Stat. 4612, amended by Act of Dec. 21, i898, Comp. Stat., Sec.
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and unloading, 19 and hands employed on a floating dredge 20 have
been held to be seamen. Clearly the Federal Employers' Liability
Act has been extended to such injured persons as can bring themselves within the term "seamen." In addition, for maritime accidents, they have their remedy in admiralty. However it is to be
regretted that Congress did not definitely extend the provisions of
the Liability Act to all cases of maritime accidents, and thus settle
conclusively the long uncertain question here discussed and bring
the last important American jurisdiction within the benefits of the
modem compensation principle.
L. H. McK.

JURISDICTION

OF PUBLIC SERVICE COMMISSION

OVER INTER-

UTILITY CONTRACTS.-Under the Pennsylvania Public Service Act I

every point of contact between the public, as such, and a public
service corporation, which has a close relation to duties and liabilities under the act, is subject to regulation by the Public Service
Commission. It is sometimes difficult, however, to determine
whether there is such a point of contact as will entitle the commission to take jurisdiction, and in this connection it is interesting2
to note two recent decisions of the Pennsylvania Supreme Court,
involving the right of the commission to inquire into the terms of a
written contract between two public utilities.
The New Street Bridge Company 3 was incorporated in 1864
under the laws of Pennsylvania, for the purpose of constructing
and operating a toll bridge across the Lehigh River in the city of
Bethlehem, Pennsylvania. The company made a written contract
with the Lehigh Valley Transit Company whereby it was agreed
that the transit company should have the sole and exclusive right
to cross the bridge with street cars, in consideration of the payment
of an annual rental to be determined with relation to the car movement and the number of passengers per car. The transit company
filed a complaint with the Pennsylvania Public Service Commission
alleging that the rates were unreasonably high, and the commission
ordered the rates reduced. The New Street Bridge Company appealed from that order.
The appellant contended that this was a private contract in the
nature of a lease, and the commission, therefore, was without juris"Disbrow v. Walsh Bros.,

77

Fed. 607 (1888).

.2Ellis v. U. S., 2o0 U. S. 246 (i9o6).

'Act

of July 26, 1913, P. L. 1374.

2New Street Bridge Company v. Public Service Commission, 114 Atl.

378 (Pa. 1921); Philadelphia City Passenger Railway Co. v. Public Service
Commission, 114 Atl. 642 (Pa. 1921).

'New Street Bridge Company v. Public Service Commission, supra.
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diction. 4 In the opinion of the court, however, the contract did not
meet the specifications of a lease. To constitute a lease there must
be such an unqualified surrender of its property or franchise by
the lessor as results in the divestment of all control for operating
purposes. In the principal case the court thought that there was no
such divestment of control by the bridge company. While the
transit company was to have the use of the bridge for the movement of its cars, this use was not exclusive. The bridge company
operated over the same right of way and was functioning, to all
intents and purposes, as an operating company. It continued to use
its bridge as a public highway for the passage of traffic, and, in so
doing, was carrying out the purposes for which it was incorporated.
The New Street Bridge Company, therefore, had not leased
its franchise or property, but was in fact an operating company
doing business directly with the public, and any contract with regard to a rate to be charged to any of its patrons is subject to
supervision by the Public Service Conmmission. This position is in
accord with the decisions in other jurisdictions, 5 where it is generally held that a contract by one public utility to furnish its service
to another similar utility can be reviewed by the Public Service
Commission. This is on the theory that the public interest is involved in these contracts and there is, therefore, such point of
contact between the public and the utility furnishing the service, as
entitles the commission to take jurisdiction.
While the position of most courts is clear as regards a commission's jurisdiction over inter-utility contracts calling for certain
services on the part of one of the utilities, it is not so certain as
to what their attitude would be in regard to the regulation of an
agreement amounting to a lease of its property and franchise by
a public service company, to another public utility. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court decided this question in the recent case of
Philadelphia City Passenger Railway Company v. Public Service
Commission.6
There were originally a number of street railway companies
in the city of Philadelphia. These companies leased I their fran'The appellant contended that this case was governed by the commission's decision in the case of City of Pittsburg v. Pittsburg Railways Co.,
8 Pa. Corp. R. 441 (i92o). In that case certain street railways in the city of
Pittsburg had leased their properties and franchises to the Pittsburg Railways Co. It was sought to join the lessors as parties defendant in an action
brought against the Pittsburg Railways Co. to determine the reasonableness
of its rates. The commission held that by their leases the lessors became
non-operating companies, that they had ceased to function as common carriers
and were therefore beyond the jurisdiction of the commission.
'Re St. Louis Light and Power Co., P. U. R., 1919 E, 379 (Ill.); re Fayette Light, Ice and Coal Co., P. U. R., 1918 E, 44 (Mo.); Minneapolis and
St. Louis Ry. Co. v. Minnesota, 186 U. S. 257 (9o).
6 Note i, supra.
'The lease was executed under authority of Act of May 15, 1895, P. L.
65. The rule is well settled that a public service corporation, which is chartered for the purpose of performing certain public duties, cannot lease its
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chises and property to the Union Traction Company, which in turn
leased to the Philadelphia Rapid Transit Company. The United
Business Men's Association complained before the Public Service
Commission that the service and facilities of the lessor companies
were inadequate, and that those companies were receiving a grossly
excessive return on the value of their properties. The jurisdiction
of the commission was contested, and was one of the questions
involved in an appeal to the Supreme Court. The court took the
position that, by making these leases, the lessor companies thereby
became non-functioning corporations and ceased to be operating
companies. Only operating companies are capable of furnishing
services and facilities at reasonable rates, which the Public Service
Act imposes as a duty upon public service companies." Therefore,
only operating companies are subject to the commission's jurisdiction in respect to services, facilities or rates. Since by the lease
these companies became non-operating corporations, and since the
complaint referred only to facilities, services and rates, the commission has no jurisdiction.
It might be urged, however, that the contract between the
lessor companies and the lessee affects the rate charged by the
lessee, since the rental paid by the Philidelphia Rapid Transit Company may properly be charged against the company's operating
expenses and would, therefore, be reflected inthe final rate to the
public. But the Pennsylvania Supreme Court takes the position
that the rentals paid under the lease have no bearing in fixing a
fair return. Such rent is not a factor in determining the value of
the transit company's property, nor is it to be considered as part of
the operating expenses, This does not mean that the leasehold
interests have no value in the eyes of the Pennsylvania court, They
have a value, but it would seem to be the physical value of the property used rather than a valuation based on fixed charges paid by
way of rental for the acquired property or franchise.
In fixing a fair value, commissions in other jurisdictions have
taken into consideration leasehold interests.9 It is not clear, however, whether they base their valuation solely on the physical value
of the property used by the corporation, or whether they consider
the value of acquired property or franchises as indicated by the
fixed rental charges. But it is certain that in some of these jurisdictions the commissions consider these fixed charges as part of
franchise or property without express legislative consent. Central Transport
Co. v. Pullman Co., I39 U. S. 24 (i,8o); Stockton v. C. R. R. of N. J.,
5o N. J. Eq. 52, 24 Atl. 964 (1892); Att'y Gen'l v. Haverhill Gaslight Co.,
215 Mass. 394, ioi N. E. io61 (1913).
Art. II, Sec. Ta.
'Re West Virginia Central Gas Co., P. U. R., 1918 C, 453 (W. Va.);
Landon v. City of Lawrence, P. U. R., 1916 B, 331 (Kan.); Campbell v.
Hood River Gas Co., P. U. R., 1915 D, 855 (Ore,).
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the company's operating expenses. 10 If, therefore, the question involved in the instant case were to come before these commissions
it would seem that they would be entitled to take jurisdiction, since
these rentals are part of the operating expenses and are therefore
an element to be considered in fixing the rate to be charged by
the lessee.
In the view adopted by the Pennsylvania court there is no
point of contact between the public and the lessor companies, since
these fixed charges in no way affect public interest. Whether or
not other jurisdictions would reach the same conclusion depends
on whether they would consider such rentals an important element
in determining the company's operating expenses, and, for that
reason, a matter in which public interest is involved. If they take
the position that these rentals are to be taken into consideration in
determining the rate, there is then a point of contact between the
public and the lessor company, and a commission would be justified
in taking jurisdiction on that ground. Therefore if a similar case
were to come before either the West Virginia or Oregon commission," it is probable that a different conclusion would be reached
from that adopted by the Pennylvania court.
W.H.N.
THE CONSTITUTIONALITY OF EMERGENCY LEGISLATION UNDEIP

POLICE PowER.-Can a legislature, to meet an emergency, enact temporary legislation under its police power to an extent which
would, as a permanent measure, be unconstitutional? The Supreme
Court of the United States has apparently rendered an affirmative
answer to that question in two recent decisions.. These cases involved the constitutionality of the so-called "Emergency Rent
Laws ;" one ' being an act of Congress passed for the District of
Columbia, the other ' an act passed by the Legislature of New
York. In Block v. Hirsh," where the act of Congress is construed,
the facts are briefly as follows: Owing to abnormal housing conditions in the District of Columbia following the war, Congress
passed a. statute giving a tenant the right, during a period of. two
years, to remain in possession if his lease expired during that period.
A commission was created to determine the amount of rental to
be paid for the new term thus created and an appeal could be taken
from its decision to the courts. The Supreme Court, by a five to
four decision, upheld the constitutionality of this statute.
The police power can be broadly divided into two classes, (I)
where the use of property itself is regulated, and (2) where the rate
THE

"Re West Virginia Central Gas Co., supra; Campbell v. Hood, supra.
= See note 9, supra.

'Block v. Hirsb, 41 U. S. Sup. Ct. 458 (1921).
'Marcus

Brown Holding Co. v. Feldman, 41 U. S. Sup. Ct. 465 (1921).

'Note I, supra.
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to be charged for the use of the property is regulated 4 In the first
case there is no limit to the kind of property that may be regulated
so long as the regulatory legislation serves a public need or interest.
Therefore, the use of admittedly private property can be regulated,
if it is to the public interest to do so.5 The Supreme Court has been
frequently called upon to determine whether or not the regulation
is in fact for the public interest. It has held valid, at various times,
as a constitutional exercise of this form of the police power, legislation regulating mining,6 hours of labor in mines,7 hours of labor
for women,8 billboards, 9 water divides in rural districts 0 sale of
cigarettes, 1 height of buildings in certain sections of a city,1 2 and
trading stamps.13 In the second class, however, where the rate to
be charged for the use of the property is attempted to be regulated,
there are constitutional limits both as to the kind of property that
may be regulated and as to the extent to which the regulation may
gQ, It is within this class that Block v. Hirsh "- falls.
In the Grain Elevator Cases '" the doctrine was laid down that
when property was "devoted to a public use" the charges for its
use may be regulated by legislation under the police power, Later
this doctrine was extended to include property which even though
not "devoted to a public use," was yet "affected with a public
interest," 11 When property became so affected it also became subject to the regulation of charges under the police power. It is only
when property falls within either of these classes that the rates for
its use may be regulated. The court has consistently refused to lay
down a definite rule for the application of these two tests, It has
preferred to decide each case on its merits without reference to a
' Fretind,

The Police Power, Chaps, 2, 4, 5, II, 18.

'Welch v. Swasey, 214 U. S. 9T, 53 L. Ed. 923 (1909) ; Barbier v. Connolly,
113 U. S. 27, ;8 L. Ed. 923 (1S85) ; Freund, The Police Power, Chap. II.
'Srickley v, Highland Boy Gold Mining Co., 20o U. S, 527, 50 L, Ed.
581 (19o5).
'Holden v. Hardy, 169 U. S. 366, 42 L. Ed. 780 (1897),
'Muller v. Oregon, 208 U S. 412,

52

L, Ed. 551 (T907).

This in effect

overruled a previous decision where the court had held unconstitutional a
law restricting the hours of labor for men. Lochner v. New York, 198 U,
S, 45, 49 L. Ed. 937 09o5),
St, Louis Poster Co. y. St. Louis, 249 U. S. 269, 63 L. Ed. 599
(1919).

"Perley.v, North Carolina, 249 U. S. 511, 63 L. Ed. 735 (919).
1

Gundling v. Chicago, 177 U. S. 183, 44 L. Ed. 725 (1900).

rWelch v, Swasey, note 5, supra.
"Rast v. Van Deman, 240 U. S. 342, 6o L. Ed. 679 (19T5).
' Note i, supra.

'Munn v. Illinois, 04 U. S. 713, 24 L. Ed. 77 (876) ; Budd v. New York,
7-13 U. S. 517, 36 L. Ed. 247 (i 9t) ; Brass v. North Dakota, 153 U. S.
3oT. 38 L, Ed. 757 (I894).
'" German Alliance Co. v, Kansas, 233 U. S. 389, 58

L, Ed. io1 (3914),
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definite and inflexible rule. The court is the final judge as to
whether property is either "devoted to a public use" or "affected
with a public interest.""
The cases show a growing inclination
of the court to hold property, hitherto considered private, as "affected with a public interest," and after Block v. Hirsh"8 it may
well be held that all property may, in an emergency and by force
of compelling circumstances, become "affected with a public interest" so as to permit regulation of the charges for its use.
Previous to IO97, all the legislation regulating charges was of
a permanent character. The property had become permanently
"affected with a public interest," so that the charges for its use
could be regulated. In 1917, however, the Supreme Court was
called upon to determine for the first time whether an emergency
could temporarily affect a matter with a public interest so as to
justify legislation under the police power. In the case of Wilson
v. New,' 9 in upholding the Adamson Act, the doctrine of the constitutionality of "emergency legislation" was first pronounced. Mr.
Chief Justice White, in delivering the opinion of the court, says:
"Although an emergency may not call into life a power which has
never lived, nevertheless emergency may afford a reason for the exertion of a living power already enjoyed." 20 This, it is submitted,
indicates that an emergency may temporarily affect property with
a public interest which is not permanently of such a nature. This
theory Block v. Hirsh 21 affirms. In addition, however, it goes
further and lays down apparently the principle that where the legislation regulating charges for property "affected with a public interest," is only temporary in character, it may go to an extent which
would not be permitted, were the legislation intended as a permanent measure. To meet an emergency Congress was allowed temporarily to interfere by regulatory legislation with rights that could
not be permanently disregarded. This the court justifies on the
ground that it is only temporary and that the legislation is necessary to meet the emergency which has temporarly affected the renting of private dwellings with a public interest.
The second limitation on the police power, where it is exercised
for the purpose of regulating the rates to be charged for the use of
property, is that the legislation is unconstitutional if it violates the
"due process" clause in case of an Act of Congress, or if it impairs
the obligation of contracts, in the case of a state statute. These
constitutional prohibitions have a much narrower scope in the case
of police power legislation than in other cases. It is for the courts
"Chicago, B. & Quincy R. R. Co. v. McGuire, =9 U. S. 549, s5L. Ed.
328 (igo); German Alliance Co. v. Kansas, note 16, supra.
""Note i, supra.
"s243 U. S. 332, 61 L. Ed. 755 (1917).
'Wilson v. New, 243 U. S. 332, at page 348.
'Note i, supra.
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to determine what
that limit is, and beyond it the police power may
22

not be extended.

Were it not for the sanction of the police power the Rent Laws
would clearly both violate the "due process" clause and impair the
obligations of contracts. Ydt under its sanction, they are held valid.
Even so, they go to an extent never before permitted by previous decisions. A man's property is taken from his control and a use is in
effect imposed upon it. A private contract, by which he was to get
his private property back, is nullified, and instead his property is
for a given period turned over to the use and control of another.
Yet, since it is only temporary and necessary to meet an emergency,
it is to be permitted. "A limit in time," says Mr. Justice Holmes,
speaking for the majority, "to tide over a passing trouble, well may
justify a law that could not be upheld as a permanent change."
The minority, on the other hand, strongly dissents from this
theory and contends that no legislation, which would be unconstitutional as a permanent measure under the police power, can
become constitutional under the same power, if only a temporary
measure. Mr. Justice McKenna, speaking for the majority, quotes
from Ex parte Milligan: 23 "No doctrine involving more pernicious
consequences, was ever invented by the wit of man than that any
of its [the Constitution's] provisions can be suspended during any
of the great exigencies of government." This doctrine, they reason, can be so extended that if the emergency be great enough, any
or all of the constitutional prohibitions may be temporarily violated
by the police power. It in fact destroys the idea of a police power
restrained within constitutional limits and makes of it, what Mr.
Justice McKenna calls an "unbounded power." 24
It is impossible to predict the-exact position which Block v.
Hirsh

2

will occupy.

Will it mark another step in the growth of

the police power and the opening up of a new field for its exercise?
Or will the court refuse to extend and apply the doctrine which it
apparently lays down? The uncertainty of the answer indicates the
importance of the decision.
P.A.M.

'McLean v. Arkansas, 211 U. S. 539, 53 L. Ed. 315 (igog); California
Reduction Co. v. Sanitary Reduction Works, 199 U. S. 3o6, 5o L. Ed. 2o4
(1905).

'Note

I, supra.

For a very able article contending for the position adopted by the
minority see, "The Police Power and the New York Rent Laws" by Geo. W.
Wickersham, 69 U. of Pa. Law Review, 301.
'Note i, sufpra.
2"

